CHAPTERI

partseven.

thefieldsofarmageddon

chapteri

duringthetwoyearsthatfollowedthebattlesofthesommeirecordedinmydailydespatches,republishedinbookform(“theleinflanders”and“thewaytovictory”),thenarrativeofthatcontinuousconflictinwhichthebritishforcesonthewesternfrontwereatdeath-gripswiththegermanmonsterwherenowonesideandthentheotherheavedthemselvesupontheiradversaryandledfortheknock-outblow,untilatlast,aftereringlossesonbothsides,theenemywasbrokentobitsinthelastcombinedattackbybritish,belgian,french,andamericanarmies.thereisnoneedformetoretellallthathistoryindetail,andiamgladtoknowthatthereisnothingineedalterintherecordofeventswhichiwroteastheyhappened,becausetheyhavenotbeenfalsifiedbyanynewevidence;andthosedetaileddescriptionsofminestandtrueinfactandintheemotionofthehoursthatpassed,whilemassesofmenwereslaughteredinthefieldsofarmageddon.

butnow,lookingbackuponthoselasttwoyearsofthewarasaneye-witnessofmanytragicandheroicthings,iseethefrightfuldramaofthemasawholeandasoneactwasrelatedtoanother,andastheplotwhichseemedsotangledandconfused,ledbyinevitablestages,notunderthecontrolofanyfield-marshalorchiefofstaff,totheclimaxinwhichempirescrashedandexhaustednationslookedroundupontheruinwhichfolloweddefeatandvictory.iseealso,asinonepicture,thecolossalscaleofthathumanleinthatarmageddonofourcivilization,whichatthetimeonereckonedonlybyeachday'sessorfailure,eachday'sslaughteronthatsideortheother.onemayaddupthewholesumaccordingtothebookkeepingoffate,bydouble-entry,creditanddebit,profitandloss.onemaysetourattacksinthebattlesofflandersagainstthestrengthofthegermandefense,andsayourlossesofthreetoone(asludendorffreckonsthem,andasmanyofusguessed)wereinourfavor,becausewecouldaffordthedifferenceofexchangeandtheenemycouldnotputsomanyhumancountersintothepoolforthefinal“kitty”inthisgamblewithlifeanddeath.onemaybalancethegermanoffensiveinmarchof'18withtheweightthatwaspilingupagainstthembytheentryoftheamericans.onemayalsoseenow,veryclearly,theparamountimportanceofthehumanfactorinthisarithmeticofwar,themoraleofmenbeingofgreaterinfluencethangeneralship,thoughdependentonit,thespiritofpeoplesbeingasvitaltoessasthemechanicalefficiencyofthewar-machine;andaboveall,oneisnowabletoobservehoweachsideblunderedoninablind,desperateway,sacrificingmassesofhumanlifewithoutaclearvisionoftheconsequences,untilatlastonesideblunderedmorethananotherandwaslost.itwillbeimpossibletopretendinhistorythatourhighcommand,oranyother,foresawthethreadofplotasitwasunraveledtotheend,andsoarrangeditsplanthateventshappenedaccordingtodesign.theeventsofmarch,1918,werenotforeseennorpreventedbyfrenchorbritish.theabilityofourgeneralswasnotimaginativenorinventive,butlimitedtothepilingupofmenandmunitions,alwaysmoremenandmoremunitions,againstpositionsofenormousstrengthandovercomingobstaclesbysheerweightoffleshandbloodandhighexplosives.theywerenotcunningsofarasicouldsee,norinthejudgmentofthemenundertheircommand,butsimpleandstraightforwardgentlemenwhosaid“oncemoreuntothebreach,”andsentupnewbattering-ramsbybrigadesanddivisions.therewasnoevidencethaticouldfindofhighdirectingbrainschoosingtheweakestspotintheenemy'sarmorandpiercingitwithasharpsword,oravoidingadirectassaultagainsttheenemy'smostformidablepositionsandleapinguponhimfromsomeunguardedway.perhapsthatwasimpossibleintheconditionsofmodernwarfareandthelimitationsofthebritishfrontuntilthearrivalofthetanks,which,foralongtime,werewastedintheimpassablebogsofflanders,wheretheirsteelskeletonsstilllierustingasaproofofheroiceffortsvainlyused.possibleornot,andraregeniusalonecouldproveitonewayoranother,itappearedtotheonlooker,aswellastothesoldierwhocarriedoutcommandsthatourmethodofwarfarewastosearchthemapforaplacewhichwasstrongestintheenemy'slines,mostdifficulttoattack,mostpowerfullydefended,andthenafterdueadvertisement,nottotakeanunfairadvantageoftheenemy,tolaunchtheassault.thathadalwaysbeentheenglishwayandthatwasourwayinmanybattlesofthegreatwar,whichwerewon(unlesstheywerelost)bythesheervalorofmenwhoatgreatcostsmashedtheirwaythroughallobstructions.

thegermans,onthewhole,showedmoreoriginalgeniusinmilitaryscience,varyingtheirmethodsofattackanddefenseaccordingtocircumstances,buildingtrenchesanddugoutswhichweneverequaled;inventingtheconcreteblockhouseor“pill-box”foraforwarddefensivezonethinlyheldinadvanceofthemainbattlezone,inordertolessentheirslaughterundertheweightofourgun-fire(itcostusdearlyforatime);scatteringtheirmeninorganizedshell-cratersinordertodistractourbarragefire;usingthe“elasticsystemofdefense”withfrightfulessagainstnivelle'sattackinthechampagne;creatingthesystemofassaultof“infiltration”whichbroketheitalianlinesatcaporettoin1917andoursandthefrenchin1918.againstallthatwemaysetonlyourtanks,whichintheendledthewaytovictory,butthegermanhighcommandblunderedatrociouslyinallthelargercalculationsofwar,sothattheybroughtaboutthedoomoftheirempirebyaseriesofactswhichwouldseemdeliberateifwehadnotknownthattheyweremerelyblind.withafollythatstillseemsincredible,theytooktheriskofaddingthegreatestpowerintheworld—innumbersofmenandinpotentialenergy—totheirlistofenemiesatatimewhentheirownman-powerwasonthewane.withdeliberatearrogancetheyfloutedtheunitedstatesandforcedhertodeclarewar.theirtemptation,ofcourse,wasgreat.thebritishnavalblockadewascausingseveresufferingbyfoodshortagetothegermanpeopleanddenyingthemaccesstorawmaterialwhichtheyneededforthemachineryofwar.

thesubmarinecampaign,ruthlesslycarriedout,wouldanddidinflictimmensedamageuponbritishandalliedshipping,andwasadeadlymenacetoengland.butgermancalculationswereutterlywrong,asludendorffinhismemoirsnowadmits,inestimatingtheamountoftimeneededtobreakherbondsbysubmarinewarfarebeforeamericacouldsendovergreatarmiestoeurope.thegermanwarlordswerewrongagaininunderestimatingthedefensiveandoffensiveessofthebritishnavyandmercantilemarineagainstsubmarineactivities.bythosemiscalculationstheylostthewarinthelongrun,andbyothererrorstheymadetheirlossmorecertain.

onemistaketheymadewastheiruttercallousnessregardingthepsychologyandtemperoftheirsoldiersandcivilianpopulation.theyputagreaterstrainuponthemthanhumannaturecouldbear,andbydrivingtheirfighting-menintooneshamblesafteranother,whiletheydopedtheirpeoplewithfalsepromiseswhichwereneverfulfilled,theysowedtheseedsofrevoltanddespairwhichfinallylaunchedthemintogulfsofruin.ihavereadnothingmorehorriblethanthecold-bloodedcrueltyofludendorff'smemoirs,inwhich,withoutanyattemptatself-excuse,herevealshimselfasusingthelivesofmillionsofmenuponagamblingchanceofvictorywiththehazardsweightedagainsthim,asheadmits.writingofjanuary,1917,hesays:“acollapseonthepartofrussiawasbynomeanstobecontemplatedandwas,indeed,notreckoneduponbyanyone...failingtheu-boatcampaignwereckonedwiththecollapseofthequadrupleallianceduring1917.”yetwiththatenormousriskvisibleahead,ludendorffcontinuedtoplaythegrandjeu,thegreatgame,anddidnotadviseanysurrenderofimperialambitionsinordertoobtainapeaceforhispeople,andwasfuriouswiththemajoritypartyinthereichstagforpreparingapeaceresolution.thecollapseofrussiainspiredhimwithnewhopesofvictoryinthewest,andagainhepreparedtosacrificemassesofmenintheslaughter-fields.butheblunderedagain,andthistimefatally.histime-tablewasoutofgear.theu—boatwarhadfailed.americanmanhoodwaspouringintofrance,andgermansoldiersontherussianfronthadbeeninfectedwithideasmostdangeroustogermandisciplineandthe“willtowin.”attheend,asatthebeginning,thegermanwarlordsfailedtounderstandthepsychologyofhumannatureastheyhadfailedtounderstandthespiritoffrance,ofbelgium,ofgreatbritain,andofamerica.oneofthemostimportantadmissionsinhistoryismadebyludendorffwhenhewrites:

“lookingback,isayourdeclinebeganclearlywiththeoutbreakoftherevolutioninrussia.ontheonesidethegovernmentwasdominatedbythefearthattheinfectionwouldspread,andontheotherbythefeelingoftheirhelplessnesstoinstilfreshstrengthintothemassesofthepeopleandtostrengthentheirwarlikeardor,waningasitwasthroughacombinationofinnumerablecircumstances.”

sotheweboffatewasspun,andmenwhothoughttheyweredirectingthedestinyoftheworldweremerelycaughtinthosewoventhreadslikepuppetstiedtostringsandmadetodance.itwastheolddanceofdeathwhichhashappenedbeforeinthefollyofmankind.