CHAPTERXIII

chapterxiii

inadespatchbysirjohnfrench,datedoctober15,1915,andissuedbythewarofficeonnovember1stofthatyear,thecommander-in-chiefstatedthat:“inviewofthegreatlengthoflinealongwhichthebritishtroopswereoperatingitwasnecessarytokeepastrongreserveinmyownhand.the11thcorps,consistingoftheguards,the21standthe24thdivisions,weredetailedforthispurpose.thisreservewasthemorenecessaryowingtothefactthatthetenthfrencharmyhadtopostponeitsattackuntiloneo'clockintheday;andfurther,thatthecorpsoperatingonthefrenchlefthadtobedirectedinamoreorlesssoutheasterlydirection,involving,incaseofouress,aconsiderablegapinourline.toinsure,however,thespeedyandeffectivesupportofthe1stand4thcorpsinthecaseoftheiress,the21stand24thdivisionspassedthenightofthe24thand25thonthelinebeuvry(totheeastofbethune)-noeux-les-mines.theguardsdivisionwasintheneighborhoodoflillersonthesamenight.”

bythatstatement,andbythefactsthathappenedinaccordancewithit,thewholeschemeofattackinthebattleoflooswillstandchallengedinhistory.lordfrenchadmitsinthatdespatchthatheheldhisreserves“inhisownhand,”andlaterhestatesthatitwasnotuntilnine-thirtyonthemorningofbattlethat“iplacedthe21stand24thdivisionsatthedisposalofthegeneralofficercommandingfirstarmy.”hestillheldtheguards.hemakes,asadefenseofthedecisiontoholdbackthereserves,theextraordinarystatementthatthere“wouldbeaconsiderablegapinourlineincaseofouress.”thatistosay,hewasactuallyenvisagingagapinthelineiftheattackeededaccordingtohisexpectations,andriskingthemostfrightfulcatastrophethatmaybefallanyarmyinanassaultuponapowerfulenemy,providedwithenormousreserves,asthegermanswereatthattime,andasourcommander-in-chiefoughttohaveknown.

butapartfromthatthewholetime-tableofthebattlewas,asitnowappears,fatallywrong.tomovedivisionsalongnarrowroadsrequiresanimmenseamountoftime,eveniftheroadsareclear,andthoseroadstowardlooswerecrowdedwiththetransportandgun-limbersoftheassaultingtroops.tomovethemindaylighttothetrenchesmeantinevitablelossoflifeandalmostcertaindemoralizationundertheenemy'sgun-fire.

“between11a.m.and12noonthecentralbrigadeofthesedivisionsfiledpastmeatbethuneandnoeux-les-mines,respectively,”wrotesirjohnfrench.itwasnotpossibleforthemtoreachouroldtrenchesuntil4p.m.itwasgen.sirfrederickmaurice,thechiefofstaff,whorevealedthatfacttomeafterwardinanofficialexplanation,anditwasconfirmedbybattalionofficersofthe24thdivisionwhomimet.

thattime-tableledtodisaster.byeighto'clockinthemorningtherewerescotsonhill70.theyhadbeentoldtogo“allout,”withthepromisethatthegroundtheygainedwouldbeconsolidatedbyfollowingtroops.yetnosupportswereduetoarriveuntil4p.m.atouroriginallineofattack—stillawaybackfromhill70—bywhichtimetheenemyhadrecoveredfromhisfirstsurprise,hadreorganizedhisguns,andwasmovinguphisownsupports.tragedybefellthescotsonhill70andinthecitest.-auguste,asihavetold.worsetragedyhappenedtothe21stand24thdivisions.theybecamehopelesslycheckedandtangledinthetrafficoftheroads,andintheirheavykitwereexhaustedlongbeforetheyreachedthebattlefield.theydrankthewateroutoftheirbottles,andthenwereparched.theyatetheirironrations,andthenwerehungry.someoftheirtransportmovedtoofarforwardindaylight,wasseenbygermanobservers,rangedonbygermanguns,andblowntobitsontheroad.thecookersweredestroyed,andwiththemthatnight'sfood.noneoftheofficershadbeentoldthattheywereexpectedtoattackonthatday.alltheyanticipatedwasthedutyofholdingtheoldsupporttrenches.inactualfacttheyarrivedwhentheenemywaspreparingaheavycounter-attackandflingingoverstormsofshell-fire.theofficershadnomapsandnoorders.theywereutterlybewilderedwiththesituation,andhadnoknowledgeastothewhere-aboutsoftheenemyortheirownobjectives.theirmenmetheavyfireforthefirsttimewhentheirphysicalandmoralconditionwasweakenedbythelongmarch,thelackoffoodandwater,andtheunexpectedterroraheadofthem.theycrowdedintobrokentrenches,whereshellsburstoverthemandintothem.youngofficersactingontheirowninitiativetriedtoleadtheirmenforward,andisolatedpartieswentforward,butuncertainly,notknowingthegroundnortheirpurpose.shrapnellashedthem,andhigh-explosiveshellsploweduptheearthaboutthemandwiththem.duskcame,andthendarkness.someofficerswerecursing,andsomewept,fearingdishonor.themenwerehuddledtogetherlikesheepwithoutshepherdswhenwolvesareabout,andsawbythebewildermentoftheofficersthattheywerewithoutleadership.itisthatwhichmakesfordemoralization,andthesemen,whoafterwardinthebattleofthesommeinthefollowingyearfoughtwithmagnificentvalor,wereonthatdayatloosdemoralizedinatragicandcompleteway.thosewhohadgoneforwardcamebacktothecrowdedtrenchesandaddedtothepanicandtherageandtheanguish.mensmashedtheirriflesinakindofmadness.boyswerecursingandweepingatthesametime.theyweretoohopelesslydisorderedanddismayedbythelackofguidanceandbytheshocktotheirsenseofdisciplinetobeofmuchuseinthatbattle.somebodiesoftheminboththeseunhappydivisionsarrivedinfrontofhill70attheverytimewhentheenemylaunchedhisfirstcounter-attack,andweredrivenbackindisorder...somedayslaterisawthe21stdivisionmarchingbackbehindthelines.rainslashedthem.theywalkedwithbentheads.theyoungofficerswereblanchedandhadabeatenlook.thesightofthosedejectedmenwastragicandpitiful.