CHAPTERXV
chapterxv
aswarcorrespondentsweweresupposedtohavehonoraryrankascaptains,bycustomandtradition—butitamountedtonothing,hereorthere.wewereciviliansinkhaki,withgreenbandsroundourrightarms,anduncertainstatus.itwasbetterso,becausewewereinthepeculiarandprivilegedpositionofbeingabletospeaktotommiesandsergeantsashumanbeings,tobeontermsofcomradeshipwithjuniorsubalternsandbattalioncommanders,andtositattherighthandofgeneralswithoutembarrassmenttothemortoourselves.
physically,manyofourgeneralswerecuriouslyalike.theywerementurnedfifty,withsquarejaws,tanned,ruddyfaces,searchingandrathersterngrayeyes,closelycroppedhairgrowingwhite,withalittlewhitemustache,neatlytrimmed,ontheupperlip.
mentallytheyhadsimilarqualities.theyhadunfailingphysicalcourage—thoughcourageisnotputtothetestmuchinmoderngeneralship,which,abovetherankofbrigadier,worksfarfromtheactuallineofbattle,unlessit“slips”inthewrongdirection.theyweresterndisciplinarians,andtestedthequalityoftroopsbytheirsmartnessinsalutingandonparade,whichdidnotaccountforthefightingmeritoftheaustralians.mostofthemwereconservativebypoliticaltraditionandhereditaryinstinct,andconservativealsoinmilitaryideasandmethods.theydistrustedthe“brilliant”fellow,andwereinclinedtothinkhimunsafe;andtheywerenotquicktoallowyoungmentogainhighcommandattheexpenseoftheirgrayhairandexperience.theywereindustrious,able,conscientiousmen,neversparingthemselveslonghoursofworkforalifeofease,andbecausetheywerewillingtosacrificetheirownlives,ifneedbe,fortheircountry'ssake,theydemandedequalwillingnessofsacrificefromeveryofficerandmanundertheirauthority,havingnomercywhateverfortheslackerortheweakling.
amongthemtherewasnotonewhosepersonalityhadthatmysteriousbutessentialqualityofgreatgeneralship—inspiringlargebodiesofmenwithexaltedenthusiasm,devotion,andfaith.itdidnotmattertothemenwhetheranarmycommander,acorpscommander,oradivisionalcommanderstoodintheroadsidetowatchthemmarchpastontheirwaytobattleorontheirwayback.theysawoneofthesesturdymeninhisbrasshat,withhisruddyfaceandwhitemustache,butnothrillpasseddowntheirranks,nohoarsecheersbrokefromthembecausehewasthere,aswhenwellingtonsatonhiswhitehorseinthepeninsularwar,oraswhennapoleonsalutedhisoldguard,orevenaswhenlordroberts,“ourbob,”cameperchedlikealittleoldfalcononhisbigcharger.
ninemenoutoftenintheranksdidnotevenknowthenameoftheirarmygeneralorofthecorpscommander.itmeantnothingtothem.theydidnotfacedeathwithmorepassionatecouragetowintheapprovalofamilitaryidol.thatwasduepartlytotheconditionsofmodernwarfare,whichmakeitdifficultforgeneralsofhighranktogetintodirectpersonaltouchwiththeirtroops,andtothemassesofmenengaged.butthosedifficultiescouldhavebeenovercomebyageneralofimpressivepersonality,abletostirtheimaginationsofmenbywordsoffirespokenattherighttime,bydeep,humansympathy,andbytheluckofvictoryseizedbydaringadventureagainstgreatodds.
nosuchmanappearedonthewesternfrontuntilfochobtainedthesupremecommand.onthebritishfronttherewasnogeneralwiththegiftofspeech—agifttoomuchdespisedbyourbritishmenofaction—orwithacharacterandprestigewhichcouldraisehimtothehighestrankinpopularimagination.duringtheretreatfrommona,sirjohnfrenchhadatouchofthatpersonalpower—hispresencemeantsomethingtothemenbecauseofhisreputationinsouthafrica;butafterward,whentrenchwarfarebegan,andthedailyroutineofslaughterundergermangun-fire,whenourartillerywasweak,andwhenourinfantrywasorderedtoattackfixedpositionsofterriblestrengthwithoutadequatesupport,andnotadog'schanceofluckagainstsuchodds,theprestigeofthecommander-in-chieffadedfrommen'smindsandhelostplaceintheiradmiration.itwaswashedoutinbloodandmud.
sirdouglashaig,whofollowedsirjohnfrench,inheritedthedisillusionmentofarmieswhosawnowthatwaronthewesternfrontwastobealongle,withenormousslaughter,andnovisiblesignoftheendbeyondavistaofdreadfulyears.sirdouglashaig,inhisgeneralheadquartersatst.-omer,andafterwardatmontreuil,nearthecoast,hadtheaffectionandloyaltyofthestaff—officers.amanofremarkablygoodlooks,withfine,delicatefeatures,strengthenedbythefirmlineofhisjaw,andofsingularsweetness,courtesy,andsimplicityinhismannertowardallwhoapproachedhim,hehadqualitieswhichmighthaveraisedhimtothesupremeheightofpersonalinfluenceamonghisarmiesbutforlackofthemagictouchandthetragicconditionofhiscommand.
hewasintenselyshyandreserved,shrinkingfrompublicityandholdinghimselfalooffromthehumansideofwar.hewasconstitutionallyunabletomakeadramaticgesturebeforeamultitude,ortosayeasy,stirringthingstoofficersandmenwhomhereviewed.hisshynessandreservepreventedhimalsofromknowingasmuchasheoughttohaveknownabouttheopinionsofofficersandmen,andgettingdirectinformationfromthem.heheldthesupremecommandofthebritisharmiesonthewesternfrontwhen,inthebattlefieldsofthesommeandflanders,ofpicardyandartois,therewasnotmuchchancefordaringstrategy,butonlyforhammer-strokesbythefleshandbloodofmenagainstfortresspositions—thegermantrenchsystems,twenty-fivemilesdeepintunneledearthworksandmachine-gundugouts—whentheimmensityofcasualtiesamongbritishtroopswasoutofallproportiontotheirgainsofground,sothatourmen'sspiritsrevoltedagainstthesemassacresoftheiryouthandtheywereembitteredagainstthegeneralshipandstaff-workwhichdirectedthesesacrificialactions.
thissenseofbitternessbecameintense,tothepointoffury,sothatayoungstaffofficer,inhisredtabs,withajauntymanner,waslikearedragtoabullamongbattalionofficersandmen,andtheydesiredhisdeathexceedingly,exaltinghislittlepersonality,dressedinawell-cuttunicandfawn-coloredriding-breechesandhighlypolishedtop-boots,intothesupremefollyof“thestaff”whichmademenattackimpossiblepositions,senddownconflictingorders,issuedalitterofdocuments—calledbyanuglyname—containingimpracticableinstructions,tothetormentoftheadjutantsandtothescornofthetroops.thishatredofthestaffwasstokedhighbythefiresofpassionanddespair.someofitwasunjust,andeventhejauntyyoungstaff-officer—ag.s.o.3,withredtabsandpolishedboots—wasoftennotquitesuchafoolashelooked,butafellowwhohadprovedhispluckintheearlydaysofthewarandwasnowdoinghisduty—aboutequaltotheworkofaboyclerk—withrealindustryandaneratedsenseofitsimportance.
personallyicanpayhightributetosomeofourstaff—officersatdivisional,corps,andarmyheadquarters,becauseoftheirindustry,efficiency,anddevotiontoduty.andduringtheprogressofbattleihaveseenthem,hundredsoftimes,workingdesperatelyforlonghourswithoutmuchrestorsleep,sothatthefighting-menshouldgettheirfoodandmunitions,sothattheartilleryshouldsupporttheiractions,andthetroopsinreservemoveuptotheirreliefatthepropertimeandplace.
owinglargelytonewarmybrainstheadministrativesideofourwarbecameefficientinitsmethodandorganization,andthearmieswereworkedlikeclockworkmachines.thetransportwasgoodbeyondallwordsofpraise,andtherewasonethingwhichseldomfailedtoreachpooroldtommyatkins,unlesshewascutoffbyshell-fire,andthatwashisfood.themotor-supplycolumnsandammunition-dumpswereorganizedtothelastitem.ourmapdepartmentwasmagnificent,andtheadmirationofthefrench.ourintelligencebranchbecamevaluable(apartfromafrequentinsanityofoptimism)andwassometimesuncannyintheaccuracyofitsinformationabouttheenemy'sdispositionandplans.sothatthestaffwasnotaltogetherhopelessinitseffect,astheyoungbattalionofficers,withsharptonguesandasenseofinjusticeintheirhearts,madeout,withpardonableblasphemy,intheirdugouts.
neverthelessthesystemwasbadandbritishgeneralshipmademanymistakes,someofthem,nodoubt,unavoidable,becauseitishumantoerr,andsomeofthemduetosheer,simple,impregnablestupidity.
intheearlydaystheoutstandingfaultofourgeneralswastheirdesiretogaingroundwhichwasutterlyworthlesswhengained.theyorganizedsmallattacksagainststrongpositions,dreadfullycostlytotake,andafterthedesperatevalorofmenhadseizedafewyardsofmangledearth,foundthattheyhadmadeanothersmallsalient,juttingoutfromtheirfrontinav-shapedwedge,sothatitwasadeath-trapforthemenwhohadtoholdit.thiswasdoneagainandagain,andirememberonedistinguishedofficersaying,withbitterirony,rememberinghowmanyofhismenhaddied,“ourgeneralsmusthavetheirlittlev'satanyprice,tojustifythemselvesatg.h.q.”
inthebattlesofthesommetheyattackedisolatedobjectivesonnarrowfronts,sothattheenemysweptourmenwithfirebyartilleryconcentratedfromallpoints,insteadofhavingtodispersehisfireduringageneralattackonawidefront.inthedaysoftrenchwarfare,whentheenemyartillerywasmuchstrongerthanours,andwhenhisinfantrystrengthwasenormouslygreater,ourgeneralsinsisteduponthebritishtroopsmaintainingan“aggressive”attitude,withtheresultthattheywereshottopieces,insteadofadopting,likethefrench,aquietandwaitingattitudeuntilthetimecameforasharpandterribleblow.thebattlesofneuvechapelle,fertubert,andloos,in1915,costusthousandsofdeadandgaveusnogainofanyaccount;andbothgeneralshipandstaff-workwere,intheopinionofmostofficerswhoknowanythingofthosebattles,ghastly.
afterall,ourgeneralshadtolearntheirlesson,liketheprivatesoldier,andtheyoungbattalionofficer,inconditionsofwarfarewhichhadneverbeenseenbefore—anditwasbadfortheprivatesoldierandtheyoungbattalionofficer,whodiedsotheymightlearn.astimewentonstaff-workimproved,andbritishgeneralshipwaslessrashinoptimismandlessrigidinideas.