第643章
第643章whatrussianreaderhasnotknownanirksomefeelingofannoyance,dissatisfaction,andperplexity,whenhereadstheaccountsofthelatterperiodofthecampaignof1812?whohasnotaskedhimself:howwasitallthefrenchwerenotcapturedorcuttopieces,whenallthethreerussianarmiesweresurroundingtheminsuperiornumbers,whenthefrenchwereadisorderly,starving,andfreezingrabble,andthewholeaimoftherussians(sohistorytellsus)wastocheck,tocutoff,andtocaptureallthefrench?
howwasitthattherussianarmy,thatwithinferiornumbershadfoughtthebattleofborodino,failedinitsaimofcapturingthefrench,whenthelatterweresurroundedonthreesides?canthefrenchbesoimmenselysuperiortousthatwearenotequaltobeatingthem,whenwehavesurroundedthemwithforcesnumericallysuperior?howcouldthathavecometopass?history(whatpassesbythatname)answersthesequestionsbysayingthatthatcametopassbecausekutuzov,andtormasov,andtchitchagov,andthisgeneralandthatfailedtocarryoutcertainman?uvres.
butwhydidtheyfailtocarrythemout?andhowwasit,iftheyreallywereresponsiblefornotattainingtheaimsetbeforethem,thattheywerenottriedandpunishedfortheirshortcomings?butevenifweadmitthatkutuzovandtchitchagovandtheotherswereresponsibleforthenon-essoftherussians,itisstillimpossibletounderstandwhy,inthepositiontherussiantroopswereinatkrasnoeandtheberezina,onbothoccasionswithnumericallysuperiorforces,thefrencharmyandmarshalswerenottakenprisoners,ifthatreallywastheaimoftherussians.
theexplanationofthisphenomenongivenbytherussianmilitaryhistorians—thatkutuzovhinderedtheattack—isinsufficient,becauseweknowthatkutuzovwasnotabletorestrainthetroopsfromattackingatvyazmaandtarutino.whywasitthattherussianarmy,thatwithinferiorforcesgainedavictoryatborodinoovertheenemyinfullstrength,wasessfulatkrasnoeandtheberezina,whenfightinginsuperiornumbersagainsttheundisciplinedcrowdsofthefrench?
iftheaimoftherussiansreallywastocutoffnapoleonandhismarshals,andtotakethemprisoners,andthataimwasnotonlyfrustrated,butallattemptsatattainingitwereeverytimedefeatedinthemostshamefulway,thislastperiodofthewarisquitecorrectlyrepresentedbythefrenchasaseriesofvictoriesforthem,andquiteincorrectlyrepresentedbytherussiansasredoundingtoourglory.
therussianmilitaryhistorians,sofarastheyrecognisetheclaimsoflogic,areforcedtothisconclusion,andinspiteoftheirlyriceulogiesofrussiangallantryanddevotion,andalltherestofit,theyarereluctantlyobligedtoadmitthattheretreatofthefrenchfrommoscowwasaseriesofvictoriesfornapoleonandofdefeatsforkutuzov.
butputtingpatrioticvanityentirelyaside,onecannotbutfeelthatthereisaninherentdiscrepancyinthisconclusion,seeingthattheseriesoffrenchvictoriesledtotheircompleteannihilation,whiletheseriesofrussiandefeatswasfollowedbythedestructionoftheirenemy,andthedeliveranceoftheircountry.
thesourceofthisdiscrepancyliesinthefactthathistorians,studyingeventsinthelightofthelettersofthesovereignsandofgenerals,ofnarratives,reports,projects,andsoon,haveassumedquitefalselythattheplanofthatperiodofthecampaignof1812wastocutoffandcapturenapoleonandhismarshalsandhisarmy.
suchaplanneverwas,andcouldnothavebeen,theaimoftherussianarmy,becauseithadnomeaning,anditsattainmentwasutterlyoutofthequestion.
therewasnoobjectinsuchaplan.inthefirstplace,becausenapoleon’sarmywasflyingindisorderatitsutmostpossiblespeedoutofrussia;thatistosay,doingtheverythingthateveryrussianmostdesired.whatobjectwasthereinconductingallsortsofoperationsagainstthefrenchwhentheywererunningawayasfastastheycouldalready?secondly,itwouldhavebeenidletostopmenontheroad,whosewholeenergieswerebentonflight.thirdly,itwouldhavebeenabsurdtolosemenindestroyingthefrencharmywhenitwasalready,withoutexternalinterference,perishingatsucharatethat,withoutanyobstructionoftheirroad,notmorethanonehundredthofitsoriginalnumbereededincrossingthefrontierindecember.
fourthly,itwasabsurdtodesiretotakeprisonerstheemperor,kings,anddukes,sincethepossessionofsuchprisonerswouldhavegreatlyenhancedthedifficultyoftherussianposition,aswasrecognisedbythemostclear-sighteddiplomatistsofthetime(j.maistreandothers).stillmoreabsurdwouldhavebeenthedesiretocapturethefrencharmywhenithaddwindledtoone-halfbeforereachingkrasnoe,andadivisionofconvoyshadtobegivenuptoguardacorpsofprisoners,whiletherussiansoldiersthemselveshadnotalwaysfullrations,andtheprisonerstheydidtakediedofhunger.