第587章

第587章afterthebattleofborodino,andthetakingandburningofmoscow,historiansconsiderthemostimportantepisodeofthewarof1812tobethemovementoftherussianarmyfromtheryazantothekalugaroadandtothetarutinocamp,theso-calledobliquemarchbehindkrasnayapahra.historiansascribethecreditofthisstrokeofgeniustovariouspersons,anddisputetowhomitisrightfullydue.evenforeign,evenfrenchhistorians,admitthegeniusoftherussiangeneralswhentheymentionthisflankmarch.butwhymilitarywriters,andothersfollowingtheirlead,assumethisobliquemovementtobeaprojectprofoundlyplannedbysomeonepersonforthedeliveranceofrussiaandtheoverthrowofnapoleonitisverydifficulttosee.itisdifficultinthefirstplacetoseewhereintheprofoundwisdomandgeniusofthismarchlies;fornogreatintellectualeffortisneededtoguessthatthebestpositionforanarmy,whennotbeingattacked,iswheresuppliesaremostplentiful.andeveryone,evenastupidboyofthirteen,couldhaveguessedthatthemostadvantageouspositionforthearmyin1812,aftertheretreatfrommoscow,wouldbeonthekalugaroad.andsoonecannotunderstand,inthefirstplace,whatconclusionsledthehistorianstoseesomedeepwisdominthisman？uvre.secondly,itisevenmoredifficulttounderstandwhythehistoriansascribetothisman？uvrethedeliveranceofrussiaandtheoverthrowofthefrench;for,hadothercircumstancespreceded,accompanied,orfollowedit,thisflankmovementmightaswellhaveledtothedestructionoftherussianarmyandthedeliveranceofthefrench.ifthepositionoftherussianarmydid,infact,begintoimprovefromthetimeofthatmarch,itdoesnotatallfollowthattheimprovementwascausedbyit.

thatobliquemarchmighthavebeennotsimplyofnouse;itmighthaveledtothedestructionoftherussianarmy,butfortheconjunctionofothercircumstances.whatwouldhavehappenedifmoscowhadnotbeenburnt？ifmurathadnotlostsightoftherussians？ifnapoleonhadnotremainedinactive？if,asbennigsenandbarclayadvised,therussianshadgivenbattlenearkrasnayapahra？whatwouldhavehappenedifthefrenchhadattackedtherussianswhentheyweremarchingbehindpahra？whatwouldhavehappenediflateronnapoleon,onreachingtarutino,hadattackedtherussianswithone-tenthoftheenergywithwhichhehadattackedthematsmolensk？whatwouldhavehappenedifthefrenchhadmarchedtopetersburg？…onanyofthesehypotheses,theobliquemarchmighthaveledtoruininsteadoftosafety.

thethirdpoint,mostdifficultofalltounderstand,isthatstudentsofhistoryseemintentionallytorefusetoseethatthismarchcannotbeascribedtoanyoneman,thatnooneforesawitatanytime,that,liketheretreattofili,theman？uvrewas,inreality,neverconceivedofbyanyoneinitsentirety,butarosestepbystep,incidentbyincident,momentbymomentfromacountlessmultitudeofthemostdiversecircumstances,andisonlyconceivedofinitsentirety,whenitisanaccomplishedfact,andhasbecomethepast.

atthecouncilatfilitheacceptedideaamongtherussians—thecoursetakenforgrantedinfact—wasretreatinadirectlineback,thatis,alongthenizhniroad.evidenceofthisisthatthemajorityofvotesatthecouncilwereforadoptingthiscourse,andthecommander-in-chief’sfamousconversationafterthecouncilwithlansky,theheadofthecommissariatdepartment,isanevenmorestrikingproofofit.lanskysubmittedtothecommander-in-chiefthatthechiefsuppliesforthearmywerestoredalongtheoka,inthetulaandkazanprovinces,andthatiftheyretreatedalongthenizhniroad,thearmywouldbecutofffromitssuppliesbythebroadriveroka,acrosswhichtransportintheearlywinterwasimpossible.thiswasthefirstproofofthenecessityofdepartingfromthecoursethathadatfirstseemedthemostnaturalone,theretreatalongthenizhniroad.thearmykeptmoretothesouthalongtheryazanroad,closertoitssupplies.laterontheinactivityofthefrench,whopositivelylostsightoftherussianarmy,anxietyforthedefenceofthetulaarsenal,andaboveall,theadvantageofbeingneartheirsuppliesledthearmytoturnevenmoretothesouth,tothetularoad.aftercrossingbyaforcedmarchbehindpahratothetularoad,thegeneralsoftherussianarmyintendedtoremainatpodolsk,andhadnoideaofthetarutinoposition.butaninfinitenumberofcircumstances,amongthemthereappearanceoffrenchtroopsonthescene,andplansforgivingbattle,andmostofall,theabundanceofsuppliesinkaluga,ledourarmytoturnevenmoretothesouth,andtopassfromthetulatothekalugaroadtotarutino,acentralpositionbetweentheirlinesofcommunicationwiththeirsupplies.justasitisimpossibletoanswerthequestionwhatdatemoscowwasabandoned,itisimpossibletootosaypreciselywhenandbywhomitwasdecidedtomovethearmytotarutino.itwasonlyafterthearmy,throughtheactionofinnumerableinfinitesimallysmallforces,hadbeenbroughttotarutino,thatpeoplebegantoprotesttothemselvesthatthatwasthecoursetheyhaddesired,andhadlongforeseenastherightone.