第613章
第613章fromthattimeuptotheendofthecampaign,allkutuzov’sactivitywaslimitedtotryingbytheexerciseofauthority,byguileandbyentreaties,toholdhisarmybackfromuselessattacks,man?uvres,andskirmisheswiththeperishingenemy.dohturovmarchedtomaleyyaroslavets,butkutuzovlingeredwiththemainarmy,andgaveordersfortheclearingofthekaluga,retreatbeyondwhichseemedtokutuzovquitepossible.
everywherekutuzovretreated,buttheenemy,withoutwaitingforhimtoretire,fledbackintheoppositedirection.
napoleon’shistoriansdescribetoushisskilfulman?uvresattarutino,andatmaleyyaroslavets,anddiscusswhatwouldhavehappenedifnapoleonhadeededinmakinghiswaytothewealthyprovincesofthesouth.
buttosaynothingofthefactthatnothinghinderednapoleonfrommarchingintothesesouthernprovinces(sincetherussianarmylefttheroadopen),thehistoriansforgetthatnothingcouldhavesavednapoleon’sarmy,becauseitcarriedwithinitselfatthattimetheinevitablegermsofruin.whyshouldthatarmy,whichfoundabundantprovisionsinmoscowandcouldnotkeepthem,buttrampledthemunderfoot,thatarmywhichcouldnotstoresuppliesonenteringsmolensk,butplunderedatrandom,whyshouldthatarmyhavemendeditswaysinthekalugaprovince,wheretheinhabitantswereofthesamerussianraceasinmoscow,andwherefirehadthesameaptitudefordestroyingwhatevertheysetfireto.
thearmycouldnothaverecovereditselfanyway.fromthebattleofborodinoandthesackingofmoscowitborewithinitself,asitwere,thechemicalelementsofdissolution.
themenofwhathadbeenanarmyfledwiththeirleaders,notknowingwhithertheywent,napoleonandeverysoldierwithhimfilledwithonedesire:tomakehisownescapeasquicklyasmightbefromthehopelesspositionofwhichallweredimlyaware.
atthecouncilinmaleyyaroslavets,whenthefrenchgenerals,affectingtobedeliberating,gavevariousopinionsastowhatwastobedone,theopinionofthebluntsoldier,mouton,whosaidwhatallwerethinking,thattheonlythingtodowastogetawayasquicklyaspossible,closedeveryone’smouth;andnoone,notevennapoleon,couldsayanythinginoppositiontothistruththatallrecognised.
butthougheverybodyknewthattheymustgo,therewasstillafeelingofshameleftatacknowledgingtheymustfly.andsomeexternalshockwasnecessarytoovercomethatshame.andthatshockcamewhenitwasneeded.itwaslehourradel’empereur,asthefrenchcalledit.
onthedayafterthecouncil,napoleon,onthepretextofinspectingthetroopsandthefieldofapastandofafuturebattle,rodeoutearlyinthemorninginthemidstofthelinesofhisarmywithasuiteofmarshalsandanescort.thecossacks,whowereinsearchofbooty,sweptdownontheemperor,andallbuttookhimprisoner.whatsavednapoleonfromthecossacksthatdaywasjustwhatwastheruinofthefrencharmy,thebooty,whichhereaswellasattarutinotemptedthecossackstolettheirpreyslip.withouttakinganynoticeofnapoleon,theydashedatthebooty,andnapoleoneededingettingaway.
whenlesenfantsdudonmightpositivelycapturetheemperorhimselfinthemiddleofhisarmy,itwasevidentthattherewasnothingelsetodobuttoflywithallpossiblehastebythenearestandthefamiliarroad.napoleon,withhisfortyyearsandhiscorpulence,hadnotallhisoldresourcefulnessandcourage,andhequitetookthehint;andundertheinfluenceofthefrightthecossackshadgivenhim,heagreedatoncewithmouton,andgave,asthehistorianstellus,theordertoretreatalongthesmolenskroad.
thefactthatnapoleonagreedwithmouton,andthatthearmydidnotretreatinthatdirection,doesnotprovethathiscommanddecidedthatretreat,butthattheforcesactingonthewholearmyanddrivingitalongthemozhaiskroadweresimultaneouslyactinguponnapoleontoo.