第596章

第596章napoleonentersmoscowafterthebrilliantvictorydelamoskowa：therecanbenodoubtofthevictory,sincethefrenchareleftinpossessionofthefieldofbattle.therussiansretreatandleavemoscow—wellstockedwithprovisions,arms,implements,andcountlessriches—inthehandsofnapoleon.therussianarmy,ofone-halfthestrengthofthefrench,duringthecourseofawholemonthmakesnoefforttoattack.napoleon’spositionismostbrilliant.onewouldhavesupposedthatnogreatgeniuswasneededwithanarmyofdoublethestrengthtofallupontherussianforcesanddestroythem,tonegotiateanadvantageouspeace;or,incaseofnegotiationsbeingrefused,tomakeamenacingmarchuponpetersburg,oreven,incaseoffailureinthis,toreturntosmolenskortovilna,ortoremaininmoscow,toretain,inshort,thebrilliantpositioninwhichthefrencharmynowfoundthemselves.todoallthisitwasonlynecessarytotakethesimplestandeasiestmeasures：tokeepthesoldiersfrompillage,topreparewinterclothes（ofwhichtherewasasupplyinmoscowamplysufficientforthewholearmy）,andregularlytocollecttheprovisions,ofwhichthesupplyinmoscowwas,ontheshowingofthefrenchhistorians,sufficienttofeedthewholearmyforsixmonths.napoleon,thegreatestofallmilitarygeniuses,withabsolutepower,ashistoriansassert,overthearmy,didnothingofallthis.

farfromdoinganythingofthesort,heusedhispowertoselectoutofallthevariouscoursesopentohimthestupidestandmostperniciousofall.ofallthedifferentthingsnapoleonmighthavedone—spendingthewinterinmoscow,goingtopetersburg,goingtonizhni-novgorod,goingbackalittlemoretothenorthortothesouth,bytheroadkutuzovafterwardstook—nocourseonecanimaginecouldhavebeenmoreruinousforhisarmy（asthesequelproved）thantheonenapoleonactuallydidadopt;thatis,thecourseofstayinginmoscowtilloctober,lettingthetroopsplunderthetown,theninhesitationleavingagarrisonbehind,marchingoutofmoscow,goingtomeetkutuzovandnotgivingbattle,turningtotherightandgoingasfarasmaleyyaroslavets,againrefusingtoriskabattle,andfinallyretreating,notbytheroadkutuzovhadtaken,butbymozhaiskandthesmolenskroutethroughdevastatedcountry.letthemostskilfultacticians,supposingthatnapoleon’sobjectwasthedestructionofhisarmy,tryanddeviseaseriesofactionswhichcould,apartfromanymeasuresthatmightbetakenbytherussianforces,haveensuredwithsuchcertaintythecompletedestructionofthewholefrencharmyasthecoursetakenbynapoleon.

thisthegeniusnapoleondid.buttosaythatnapoleonruinedhisarmybecausehewantedtodoso,orbecausehewasverystupid,wouldbejustasunjustastosaythatnapoleongothistroopstomoscowbecausehewantedto,andbecausehewasverycleverandagreatgenius.

inbothcaseshispersonalactivity,havingnomoreforcethanthepersonalactivityofeverysoldier,wasmerelycoincidentalwiththelawsbywhichtheeventwasdetermined.

quitefalsely（andsimplybecausethesequeldidnotjustifynapoleon’sactions）dohistoriansrepresentnapoleon’sfacultiesasingatmoscow.justasbefore,andafterwardsintheyear1813,heusedallhispowersandfacultiestodothebestforhimselfandhisarmy,napoleon’sactivityatthistimewasnolessmarvellousthaninegypt,initaly,inaustria,andinprussia.wedonotknowwithanycertaintyhowrealwasthegeniusofnapoleoninegypt,wherefortycenturieslookeddownuponhisgreatness,becauseallhisgreatexploitstherearerecountedtousbynonebutfrenchmen.wecannotjudgewithcertaintyofhisgeniusinaustriaandprussia,astheaccountsofhisdoingstheremustbedrawnfromfrenchandgermansources.andtheountablesurrenderofcorpsofsoldierswithoutabattle,andoffortresseswithoutasiege,mustdisposegermanstopostulatenapoleon’sgeniusastheuniqueexplanationofthewarasitwaswagedingermany.butwehave,thankgod,noneedtopleadhisgeniustocloakourshame.wehavepaidfortherighttolookfactssimplyandsquarelyintheface,andthatrightwewillnotgiveup.

hisactivityinmoscowwasasmarvellousandasfullofgeniusasanywhereelse.commanduponcommandandplanuponplanwascontinuallybeingissuedbyhimfromthetimeheenteredmoscowtothetimeheleftit.theabsenceofthecitizensandofadeputation,andeventheburningofmoscow,didnotdaunthim.hedidnotlosesightofthewelfareofhisarmy,norofthedoingsoftheenemy,norofthewelfareofthepeopleofrussia,noroftheconductofaffairsatparis,norofdiplomaticnegotiationsastothetermsofpeace.