第473章

第473章fromthebattlefieldadjutantswerecontinuallygallopinguptonapoleonwithreportsfromhismarshalsoftheprogressoftheaction.butallthosereportsweredeceptive；bothbecauseintheheatofbattleitisimpossibletosaywhatishappeningatanygivenmoment，andbecausemanyoftheadjutantsneverreachedtheactualbattlefield，butsimplyrepeatedwhattheyheardfromothers，andalsobecause，whiletheadjutantwasgallopingthetwoorthreeverststonapoleon，circumstanceshadchanged，andthenewshebroughthadalreadybecomeuntrue.thusanadjutantcamegallopingfromtheviceroywiththenewsthatborodinohadbeentakenandthebridgeonthekolotchawasinthehandsofthefrench.theadjutantaskednapoleonshouldthetroopscrossthebridge.napoleon’scommandwastoformonthefurthersideandwait；butlongbeforehegavethatcommand，whentheadjutantindeedhadonlyjuststartedfromborodino，thebridgehadbeenbrokendownandburntbytherussiansintheveryskirmishpierrehadtakenpartinatthebeginningoftheday.

anadjutant，gallopingupfromtheflècheswithapaleandfrightenedface，broughtnapoleonwordthattheattackhadbeenrepulsed，andcompanswoundedanddavoustkilled；whilemeantimetheflècheshadbeencapturedbyanotherdivisionofthetroops，anddavoustwasaliveandwell，exceptforaslightbruise.uponsuchinevitablymisleadingreportsnapoleonbasedhisinstructions，whichhadmostlybeencarriedoutbeforehemadethem，orelsewerenever，andcouldnever，becarriedoutatall.

themarshalsandgeneralswhowereclosertothesceneofaction，but，likenapoleon，notactuallytakingpartinit，andonlyatintervalsridingwithinbulletrange，madetheirplanswithoutaskingnapoleon，andgavetheirordersfromwhereandinwhatdirectiontofire，andwherethecavalryweretogallopandtheinfantrytorun.buteventheirorders，likenapoleon’s，werebutrarely，andtoaslightextent，carriedout.

forthemostpartwhathappenedwastheoppositeofwhattheycommandedtobedone.thesoldiersorderedtoadvancefoundthemselvesundergrapeshotfire，andranback.thesoldierscommandedtostandstillinoneplaceseeingtherussiansappearsuddenlybeforethem，eitherranawayorrusheduponthem；andthecavalryunbiddengallopedinaftertheflyingrussians.inthiswaytwocavalryregimentsgallopedacrossthesemyonovskoyehollow，andassoonastheyreachedthetopofthehill，turnedandgallopedheadlongbackagain.theinfantry，inthesameway，movedsometimesinthedirectionoppositetothatinwhichtheywerecommandedtomove.

alldecisionsastowhenandwheretomovethecannons，whentosendinfantrytofire，whentosendcavalrytotrampledowntherussianinfantry—allsuchdecisionsweremadebythenearestofficersintheranks，withoutanyreferencetoney，davoust，andmurat，farlesstonapoleonhimself.theydidnotdreadgettingintotroublefornonfulfilmentoforders，norforassumingresponsibility，becauseinbattlewhatisatstakeiswhatismostprecioustoeveryman—hisownlife；andatonetimeitseemsasthoughsafetyistobefoundinflyingback，sometimesinflyingforward；andthesemenplacedintheverythickofthefrayactedinaccordancewiththetemperofthemoment.

inrealityallthesemovementsforwardandbackagainhardlyimprovedoraffectedthepositionofthetroops.alltheironslaughtsononeanotherdidlittleharm；theharm，thedeathanddisablementwastheworkofthecannonballsandbullets，thatwereflyingallabouttheopenspace，wherethosemenrantoandfro.assoonastheygotoutofthatexposedspace，overwhichtheballsandbulletswereflying，theirsuperiorofficerpromptlyformedthemingoodorder，andrestoreddiscipline，andundertheinfluenceofthatdisciplineledthembackunderfireagain；andthereagain，undertheinfluenceoftheterrorofdeath，theylostalldiscipline，anddashedtoandfroatthechancepromptingsofthecrowd.