第447章

第447章farfromhavingfortifiedthepositionontheleftatrightanglestotheroad—thatisthespotonwhichthebattlewasfought—therussiansnever,tillthe25thofaugust,1812,dreamedofabattlebeingpossibleonthatspot.theproofofthisis,first,thattherewerenofortificationstherebeforethe25th,andthattheearthworksbegunonthatdaywerenotcompletedbythe26th;and,secondly,theshevardinoredoubt,owingtoitssituationinfrontofthepositiononwhichthebattlewasactuallyfought,wasofnorealvalue.withwhatobjectwasthatredoubtmorestronglyfortifiedthananyoftheotherpoints？andwithwhatobjectwaseveryeffortexhaustedandsixthousandmensacrificedtodefendittilllateatnightonthe24th？apicketofcossackswouldhavebeenenoughtokeepwatchontheenemy’smovements.andathirdproofthatthepositionofthebattlefieldwasnotforeseen,andthattheredoubtofshevardinowasnottheforemostpointofthatposition,istobefoundinthefactthatbarclaydetollyandbagrationwere,tillthe25th,undertheimpressionthattheshevardinoredoubtwastheleftflankoftheposition,andthatkutuzovhimself,inthereportwritteninhothasteafterthebattle,speaksofshevardinoastheleftflankoftheposition.onlyagoodtimelater,whenreportsofthebattlewerewrittenatleisure,theincorrectandstrangestatementwasinvented（probablytocovertheblundersofthecommander-in-chief,whohad,ofcourse,toappearinfallible）thattheshevardinoredoubtservedasanadvancepost,thoughitwasinrealitysimplythefortifiedpointoftheleftflank,andthatthebattleofborodinowasfoughtbyusonafortifiedpositionselectedbeforehandforit,thoughitwasinrealityfoughtonapositionquiteunforeseen,andalmostunfortified.

theaffairobviouslytookplaceinthisway.apositionhadbeenpitchedupononthestreamkolotcha,whichintersectsthehigh-road,notatarightangle,butatanacuteangle,sothattheleftflankwasatshevardino,therightnearthevillageofnovoe,andthecentreatborodino,neartheconfluenceofthekolotchaandthevoina.anyonelookingattheplainofborodino,andnotconsideringhowthebattleactuallywasfought,wouldpickoutthisposition,coveredbythekolotcha,astheobviousoneforanarmy,whoseobjectwastochecktheadvanceofanenemymarchingalongthesmolenskroadtowardsmoscow.

napoleon,ridinguponthe24thtovaluev,didnot（wearetoldinthehistories）seethepositionoftherussiansfromutitsatoborodino（hecouldnothaveseenthatpositionsinceitdidnotexist）,anddidnotseetheadvancepostsoftherussianarmy,butinthepursuitoftherussianrearguardstumbledupontheleftflankoftherussianpositionattheredoubtofshevardino,and,tothesurpriseoftherussians,histroopscrossedthekolotcha.andtherussians,sinceitwastoolateforageneralengagement,withdrewtheirleftwingfromthepositiontheyhadintendedtooccupy,andtookupanewposition,whichhadnotbeenforeseen,andwasnotfortified.bycrossingtotheleftbankofthekolotcha,ontheleftoftheroad,napoleonshiftedthewholebattlefromrighttoleft（lookingfromtherussianside）,andtransferredittotheplainbetweenutitsa,semyonovskoyeandborodino—aplainwhichinitselfwasanomorefavourablepositionthananyotherplaininrussia—andonthatplainwasfoughtthewholebattleofthe26th.

hadnapoleonnotreachedthekolotchaontheeveningofthe24th,andhadhenotorderedtheredoubttobeattackedatoncethatevening,hadhebeguntheattacknextmorning,noonecouldhavedoubtedthattheshevardinoredoubtwastheleftflankoftherussianposition;andthebattlewouldhavebeenfoughtasweexpected.inthatcaseweshouldprobablyhavedefendedtheshevardinoredoubtbyourleftflankevenmoreobstinately;weshouldhaveattackednapoleoninthecentreorontheright,andthegeneralengagementwouldhavebeenfoughtonthe24thonthepositionpreparedandfortifiedforit.butastheattackwasmadeonourleftflankintheeveningaftertheretreatofourrearguard,thatis,immediatelyaftertheactionatgridnevo,andastherussiangeneralswouldnot,orcouldnot,beginthegeneralengagementontheeveningofthe24th,thefirstandmostimportantactionofthebattleofborodinowaslostonthe24th,andthatlossledinevitablytothelossofthebattlefoughtonthe26th.

afterthelossoftheshevardinoredoubt,wefoundourselvesonthemorningofthe25thwithourleftflankdrivenfromitsposition,andwereforcedtodrawintheleftwingofourpositionandhurriedlyfortifyitwerewecould.

sothatonthe26thofaugusttherussiantroopswereonlydefendedbyweak,unfinishedearthworks,andthedisadvantageofthatpositionwasaggravatedbythefactthattherussiangenerals,notfullyrecognisingthefactsoftheposition（thelossofthepositionontheleftflank,andtheshiftingofthewholefieldofthecomingbattlefromrighttoleft）,retainedtheirextendedformationfromnovoetoutitsa,and,consequently,hadtotransfertheirtroopsfromrighttoleftduringthebattle.consequently,wehadduringthewholebattletofacethewholefrencharmyattackingourleftwing,withourforcesofhalfthestrength.

（poniatovsky’sactionfacingutitsaanduvarov’sactionagainstthefrenchrightflankwerequiteindependentofthegeneralcourseofthebattle.）

andsothebattleofborodinowasfought,notatallas,inordertocovertheblundersofourcommanders,itisdescribedbyourhistorians,whoseaccounts,consequently,diminishthecreditduetotherussianarmyandtherussianpeople.thebattleofborodinowasnotfoughtonacarefullypickedandfortifiedposition,withforcesonlyslightlyweakerontherussianside.afterthelossoftheshevardinoredoubt,therussiansfoughtonanopen,almostunfortifiedposition,withforceshalfthestrengthofthefrench,thatis,inconditionsinwhichitwasnotmerelysenselesstofightfortenhoursandgainadrawnbattle,butincrediblydifficulttokeepthearmyforthreehourstogetherfromabsoluteroutandflight.