第355章

第355章towardstheendoftheyear1811，therebegantobegreateractivityinlevyingtroopsandinconcentratingtheforcesofwesterneurope，andin1812theseforces—millionsofmen，reckoningthoseengagedinthetransportandfeedingofthearmy—movedfromthewesteastward，towardsthefrontiersofrussia，where，since1811，therussianforceswerebeinginlikemannerconcentrated.

onthe12thofjunetheforcesofwesterneuropecrossedthefrontier，andthewarbegan，thatis，aneventtookplaceopposedtohumanreasonandallhumannature.millionsofmenperpetratedagainstoneanothersogreatamassofcrime—fraud，swindling，robbery，forgery，issueofcounterfeitmoney，plunder，incendiarism，andmurder—thattheannalsofallthecriminalcourtsoftheworldcouldnotmustersuchasumofwickednessinwholecenturies，thoughthemenwhocommittedthosedeedsdidnotatthattimelookonthemascrimes.

whatledtothisextraordinaryevent？whatwereitscauses？historians，withsimple-heartedconviction，tellusthatthecausesofthiseventweretheinsultofferedtothedukeofoldenburg，thefailuretomaintainthecontinentalsystem，theambitionofnapoleon，thefirmnessofalexander，themistakesofthediplomatists，andsoon.

accordingtothem，ifonlymetternich，rumyantsev，ortalleyrandhad，intheintervalbetweenalevéeandacourtball，reallytakenpainsandwrittenamorejudiciousdiplomaticnote，orifonlynapoleonhadwrittentoalexander，“iconsenttorestoretheduchytothedukeofoldenburg，”therewouldhavebeennowar.

wecanreadilyunderstandthatbeingtheconceptionofthewarthatpresenteditselftocontemporaries.wecanunderstandnapoleon’ssupposingthecauseofthewartobetheintriguesofengland（ashesaid，indeed，inst.helena）；wecanunderstandhowtothemembersoftheenglishhouseofcommonsthecauseofthewarseemedtobenapoleon’sambition；howtothedukeofoldenburgthewarseemedduetotheoutragedonehim；howtothetradingclassthewarseemedduetothecontinentalsystemthatwasruiningeurope；totheoldsoldiersandgeneralsthechiefreasonforitseemedtheirneedofactiveservice；totheregimentsoftheperiod，thenecessityofre-establishinglesbonsprincipes；whilethediplomatistsofthetimesetitdowntotheallianceofrussiawithaustriain1809nothavingbeenwithsufficientcareconcealedfromnapoleon，andthememorandum，no.178，havingbeenawkwardlyworded.wemaywellunderstandcontemporariesbelievinginthosecauses，andinacountless，endlessnumbermore，themultiplicityofwhichisduetotheinfinitevarietyofmen’spointsofview.buttousofalatergeneration，contemplatinginallitsvastnesstheimmensityoftheaccomplishedfact，andseekingtopenetrateitssimpleandfearfulsignificance，thoseexplanationsmustappearinsufficient.tousitisinconceivablethatmillionsofchristianmenshouldhavekilledandtorturedeachother，becausenapoleonwasambitious，alexanderfirm，englishpolicycrafty，andthedukeofoldenburghardlytreated.wecannotgrasptheconnectionbetweenthesecircumstancesandthebarefactofmurderandviolence，norwhytheduke’swrongsshouldinducethousandsofmenfromtheothersideofeuropetopillageandmurdertheinhabitantsofthesmolenskandmoscowprovincesandtobeslaughteredbythem.

forusofalatergeneration，whoarenothistoriansledawaybytheprocessofresearch，andsocanlookatthefactswithcommon-senseunobscured，thecausesofthiswarappearinnumerableintheirmultiplicity.themoredeeplywesearchoutthecausesthemoreofthemwediscover；andeverycause，andevenawholeclassofcausestakenseparately，strikesusasbeingequallytrueinitself，andequallydeceptivethroughitsinsignificanceincomparisonwiththeimmensityoftheresult，anditsinabilitytoproduce（withoutalltheothercausesthatconcurredwithit）theeffectthatfollowed.suchacause，forinstance，occurstousasnapoleon’srefusaltowithdrawhistroopsbeyondthevistula，andtorestoretheduchyofoldenburg；andthenagainwerememberthereadinessorthereluctanceofthefirstchancefrenchcorporaltoserveonasecondcampaign；forhadhebeenunwillingtoserve，andasecondandathird，andthousandsofcorporalsandsoldiershadsharedthatreluctance，napoleon’sarmywouldhavebeenshortofsomanymen，andthewarcouldnothavetakenplace.

ifnapoleonhadnottakenoffenceattherequesttowithdrawbeyondthevistula，andhadnotcommandedhistroopstoadvance，therewouldhavebeennowar.butifallthesergeantshadbeenunwillingtoserveonanothercampaign，therecouldhavebeennowareither.